The United States fought two major wars in the 20th century in Europe, almost went to war with the USSR over a divided Europe, and ended the century in a conflict in Southeastern Europe alongside European allies both old and new. Top American and European decision-makers reinforced the principle time and time again that the future of one side of the Atlantic was vitally important to the future of the other.

The U.S. fought for and gained its independence from Great Britain in the 18th century, building a democracy based on European political ideas. The U.S. also fought against Germany in two wars in the 20th century. Today, these two countries are among America’s strongest allies, alongside France, which has been an ally of the United States since the American Revolution.

Before the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11th, European and American interests seemed to be drifting apart. During President George W. Bush’s visits to Europe in the summer of 2001, discussions were generally cordial, but underlying disagreements persisted in respect to missile defense, environmental protection, and the death penalty. American and European leaders seemed to agree that they disagreed.

During that time, anti-American sentiment was quite strong among Europeans. New York Times journalist Suzanne Daley wrote at that time, “while the United States may be aghast at European tax rates and sneer at what they consider gumption-killing welfare benefits, Europeans look across at America and see a harsh society, with far too many have-nots.”

Political expert Charles Grant of the London-based Center for European Reform agrees, “we are definitely in a period of growing strains in the transatlantic alliance. Both continents are changing in ways that neither understands or appreciates.”

Others consider transatlantic worries overrated. Anthony Blinken of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a major Washington D.C.-based think tank, suggests, “the ‘crisis’ in U.S.—European relations is largely a myth … The motives behind this mischief may include the desire to diminish America’s global influence, to use the United States as a scapegoat for domestic political gain, or to sell newspapers. Or it may reflect that, for all its strength, the transatlantic relationship is in a period of transition.”

Blinken continues, “The end of the Cold War buried America and Europe’s … interdependence. Into the vacuum surged two largely complementary but sometimes conflicting phenomena: American “hyperpower” and a new European identity forged by economic, political, and security integration. As a result, American and European elites focus less on common values and interests and more on their differences.”

The attacks of September 11th provided a new focus as American and European leaders confronted a new common enemy. Discussion of differences abruptly shifted to collaboration and recognition of similarities, with both sides realizing that the transatlantic alliance is stronger and more important than recently imagined. European allies have become essential partners in an international coalition waging war against terrorism, combining financial and intelligence instruments with military and political might.

Of course, many Americans recognize that relations with Europe are an important part of U.S. foreign policy. The presence of European culture in everyday American life, however, is so pervasive that it is often less obvious. Most Americans are of European ancestry. Most of the foreign languages taught in American schools are European: French, German, Spanish, and Italian. Millions of European and American tourists and business people fly across the Atlantic every year.

Even less obvious—but very important—is the economic interdependence between Europe and the United States:

- Transatlantic trade and investment total $36 billion per day.
- In the past six years, American investment in Europe has increased seven-fold.
- Three million Europeans work for American-owned companies in Europe.
- There are over 4,000 European-owned businesses in the U.S.
- European companies lead foreign investment in 41 out of 50 U.S. states—including Pennsylvania.
- One in twelve factory workers in the U.S. is employed by a European-owned business.

The attacks of September 11th did not diminish Europe’s determination to reassert its position in the world. The European Union (EU) has become a much more potent political force. Making up approximately one-third of the world’s economy, the EU will introduce a new common currency—the euro—in 2002. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been transformed from a Cold War security alliance into a major instrument for regional security in which European partners play an increasing role. European nations are key members of the world’s major political, economic, and security institutions.

Clearly, the transatlantic relationship needs to redefine itself and promote a new balance of responsibilities. The relationship is complex, and both sides must exercise care in managing and maintaining it. The attacks of September 11th did not change these realities—it remains to be seen whether the attacks ultimately blur these realities or bring them into sharper focus.

The following pages highlight how this relationship has evolved since World War II, Europe’s challenges in a post-Cold War and post-September 11th world, and some of the implications for U.S. policy.
AMERICA’S COMMITMENT TO EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II

The physical demolition and psychological devastation of Europe after World War II was tremendous. Concerns about Communism taking root in such a political and economic climate prompted the U.S. to invest both in Europe’s economic recovery and in its security.

The first step was the Marshall Plan, named for U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who announced the plan in a June 1947 address at Harvard University. The plan called for a European Recovery Program designed to deal with the widespread hunger, unemployment, and severe housing shortage throughout Europe. Over its four-year life span, the U.S. spent $13.3 billion for European recovery—then, the most expensive foreign policy step ever made in peacetime.

Next was for the U.S. to commit itself to the defense of Europe—again, something it had never done before in peacetime. Recall that, following World War I, the U.S. had retreated into isolation, and many believe this to have been one of the causes of World War II. On May 19, 1948, the U.S. Senate passed the Vandenberg Resolution, which permitted “association ... with such regional and other collective self-help and mutual aid as affect its national security.” The result was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), signed in 1949, which provided the framework for an American security guarantee and a military presence in Europe that continues to this day.

The Vandenberg Resolution’s requirement for “self-help and mutual aid” has been a consistent U.S. signal that Europe should be as self-sufficient as possible even as it looked to the U.S. for an overarching security guarantee. Thus, even while the NATO Treaty was being drafted, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the Brussels Treaty, which established the West European Union (WEU) as a collective defense agreement among Europeans. Once NATO was in place a year later, the WEU took a back seat and had little function throughout the Cold War. Only in the 1990s did Europeans look to strengthen the WEU as a European defense organization. Many in the U.S. saw this as a European attempt to compete with NATO. This has its own irony, since the WEU was in many ways a precondition for the U.S. to agree to NATO in the first place.

THE NATO COMMITMENT

At the heart of the NATO Treaty’s collective defense arrangement is the declaration, in Article V, that an attack on one is an attack on all. Actually, despite the history of the Cold War, this article was never invoked until September 12, 2001, following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

In reality, of course, declaring that an attack on an ally is an attack on you does not require that you respond with military force. No U.S. Senate would consent to ratifying a treaty that took away its right to declare war. Depending on the circumstances, military force may not be an appropriate or desirable step.

Early Steps Toward European Integration

The security provided by this American commitment allowed European nations to begin the first steps toward European integration. The economic investment of the Marshall Plan, coupled with the U.S. security guarantee in NATO, marked the end of the postwar occupation of Germany and the beginning of a new transatlantic relationship. This new relationship also allowed Germany (at least its western half) to be incorporated as an ally rather than a former enemy. In many ways, Germany was key to rebuilding Europe after the war. Integrating Germany into a broader web of European political,
economic, and security institutions meant that Germany could become strong again without threatening its neighbors.

The dream of European integration was championed by Jean Monnet, a French economist who argued that the only solution for peace in Europe was European political integration, which would emerge in time only if Europeans first began to integrate their economies.

In 1950, Monnet drafted the Schuman Plan, named after French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, which established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The ECSC established a supranational authority—an authority above that of national governments—to coordinate the coal and steel industries of France and West Germany. Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy also joined.

By 1958, in the Treaty of Rome, these same six European powers formed the European Economic Community (EEC), or “Common Market,” as a further step toward integrating their economies.

Great Britain was not part of the Common Market, having proposed instead that the EEC be expanded into a transatlantic common market that included the U.S. and Canada. France vetoed that proposal. Five years later, France also vetoed Britain’s entry into the Common Market. Britain meanwhile had formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with countries that were not part of the Common Market. Britain, along with Ireland and Denmark, did not join the Common Market—then called the European Community (EC)—until 1973. Greece, Spain, and Portugal joined in 1986.

Although Monnet and others eventually saw political integration of Europe as the ultimate objective of a common market, little progress toward that end was possible as long as Europe was divided in the Cold War. Political and security policies required the active participation of the United States, and NATO remained the dominant European institution. The EC remained largely focused on developing a strong economic foundation and—from the mid-1980s—incorporating new members whose relative economic weakness was a net drain on the whole system.

Not until the Berlin Wall came down, Germany was unified, and the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe was totally dismantled, could the EC return seriously to the vision offered by Monnet at the end of World War II; only then could European nations give greater weight to the political and security aspects of European integration.

EUROPE AFTER THE COLD WAR

In ways that no one had imagined only a few years before, the end of the Cold War meant that one could conceive of creating a “Europe, whole and free.” The dividing line between East and West Europe was gone. But this new reality created four basic questions for both NATO and the European Community:

1. What is our purpose?
2. How do we strengthen our institutions?
3. Do we invite new states to join?
4. How does this affect the transatlantic relationship?

The answers for both NATO and the EC were very much the same:

1. Both redefined a post-Cold War purpose that emphasized shaping a new Europe by holding out the same kind of economic and political security that was important in rebuilding after World War II.
2. Both tried to adapt their institutions to new realities.
3. Both eventually (but reluctantly at first) decided to enlarge their membership, paying particular attention to Russian sensitivities and concerns.
4. Both claimed they needed a strong transatlantic relationship, but some tensions persisted.

DEFINING THE EUROPEAN UNION

The “European Community” became the “European Union” with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. This treaty represented a major step forward toward the objective of eventual political integration, establishing central European institutions with new powers to make laws that affect the lives of citizens of all member states. It provided for the free movement of labor, goods, and capital among EU member states. It also established provisions for a common European passport—a “citizenship common to nationals of [Member] countries.”

The effect of Maastricht, and the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam that came later, was to strengthen further the reach of the EU’s political, economic, and social institutions into the lives of the citizens of EU member states. Because people were able to move and work wherever they wanted within the EU, rules needed to be more consistent, rather than varying dramatically from one country to the next.

As one senior U.S. official noted privately, EU integration was opposite the process that occurred within the U.S. in its early years. In the U.S., the Articles of Confederation gave way to the Constitution, in which the central government in Washington took over defense and foreign affairs, while the individual states retained a great deal of independence in setting laws about social policy, economic practice, and the role of government in everyday lives. In Europe, integration has increasingly transferred those issues to central institutions in Brussels, while leaving defense and foreign affairs largely up to individual national capitals.
Will the EU be a new United States of Europe?

In the U.S., the central government has executive, legislative, and judicial branches, with separate governments in each of the fifty states. In the EU, there are also executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, plus a huge central bureaucracy to support their work, paralleling each member states’ national governments. Nonetheless, Europeans insist that the EU will not be a “United States of Europe.” European integration is creating a feeling of belonging to Europe, but is a completely different model from that of the U.S.

There are five main EU institutions and several others that manage these three realms of government. Of these, the principal decision-making triangle includes the Commission (which proposes a law), the Parliament (which discusses and argues the law), and the Council (which makes the final decision):

The European Commission includes 20 members who are appointed by the national governments to uphold the general interest of the EU. This body represents the supranational nature of the EU, acting as its representative on the international stage, and negotiating trade and cooperation agreements.

The European Parliament includes 626 representatives who are elected by the citizens of the EU member states. Each nation can elect a certain number of Members of Parliament according to its population size. The EP shares legislative and budgetary powers with the Council, and exercises democratic supervision over the executive body, the Commission.

The Council of the European Union is the main decision-making body and is composed of one representative from each member state. For the most important decisions, this body gathers the Heads of State or Government into what is called the European Council. More often, the Council meets on the level of working groups, ambassadors, or ministers.

The European Court of Justice acts as the judicial branch, ensuring that EU laws and treaties are uniformly interpreted and applied.

Even in defense and foreign affairs, advocates of European integration argue it is only a matter of time before the EU dominates individual member states. For example, Maastricht set as one of its objectives, “to assert [Europe’s] identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense.”

The language illustrates an underlying tension. The Treaty gives special importance to the long-dormant Western European Union but then confirms that nothing should be inconsistent with the NATO framework to which all of the twelve EU states in 1992—except Ireland—belonged. Yet, on broader foreign policy questions, the EU has, since Maastricht, typically spoken with one voice in multinational institutions and bilateral negotiations, typically through the member country that holds the rotating EU Presidency for a particular six-month period.

The Maastricht Treaty created an additional institution designed ultimately to restrict the influence of member states. The Committee of the Regions brings together representatives of regional and local authorities, such as the Basque region of Spain, the Bretagne region of France, or Flanders in Belgium. (As an illustration, if the U.S. were an EU member, each of our 50 states might be represented on this committee, but the U.S. would not be.) This committee is consulted in various areas of social and economic policy.

Advocates of this regional approach argue that problems should be solved by individual regions working together—even across national boundaries, without interference from national capitals, whether London, Berlin, Paris, or Rome. Although the Committee of the Regions does not have a lot of power today, many want to increase its influence so it would be a counterweight to national capitals.

Critics of this trend towards integration, on the other hand, worry that policy will end up being made by faceless bureaucrats in Brussels or elsewhere, who are not accountable to a real democratic political process. Although elected political leaders in the EU represent their countries in the Commission, and members of the European Parliament are elected, democratically elected governments in individual capitals tend to be viewed as more responsive to their constituents.

Recent Public Opinion Results from Eurobarometer:

- 40% of European Union citizens are satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU.
- 38% agree that there is a shared European identity.
- 92% of the EU’s top decision-makers consider EU membership a good thing, but only 48% of the general public agree.
- 90% of top decision-makers believe their own country has benefited from EU membership, but only 43% of the general public agree.
EUROPE’S COMMON CURRENCY—THE “EURO”

The global symbol of European integration is the “euro,” Europe’s common currency. The Maastricht Treaty began preparations for a single European Monetary Union. The objective was to create a single European economy with a common currency, rather than each country having its own currency, central bank rules, and economic policies.

By January 1999, eleven states—Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland—were ready to implement a new, common European currency. Trade was conducted in euros and the value of each national currency was pegged to the euro. It also marked the beginning of a transition period, building to January 2002, when the euro replaces national currencies in those eleven countries, plus Greece.

As of this writing, Britain, Denmark, and Sweden have chosen not to adopt the common currency. They will continue to use their national currencies even after the euro becomes the “street currency” in 2002.

Euro-supporters argue that this common currency would create a stable business environment, stimulate economic growth and competitiveness, ease travel, and facilitate price comparisons. Debate remains whether the euro will become a formidable competitor to the U.S. dollar, or whether the two currencies can strengthen and stabilize the global economy together.

EU ENLARGEMENT

Although the enlargement of the European Union is not as controversial for Russia as is NATO enlargement, within the EU there remains substantial debate over how far the boundaries of the EU should extend. Most of this debate concerns the economic consequences of incorporating weaker economies into the common market. This was the case in the 1970s and 1980s as the EC expanded to include Ireland and the Mediterranean countries of Greece, Spain, and Portugal. From the time they joined the EC, their weak economies have benefited considerably from the assistance they received from the stronger EU members.

EU Members (15—with year joined)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year Joined</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1981</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1973</td>
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EU Candidate Members (13)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>First wave beginning</th>
<th>Second wave by ??</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Malta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Romania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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</table>

Special Status—No Date

Turkey

The same situation exists for those countries now seeking membership to the European Union. After the end of the Cold War, the physical boundary between Western and Eastern Europe was destroyed, along with any notion that the European Union would remain a union of Western European countries. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic joined NATO in 1999, and are now going through the lengthy and complex process of integrating the laws and treaties of the EU into their own national systems. Some former Soviet Republics are following a similar course.

Greece-Turkey-Cyprus

The European Commission and most member states agree that the “biggest political headache for EU enlargement” will be Cyprus. The issues among Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus span ethnic loyalties, human rights issues and territorial disputes. Although EU accession procedures are on schedule, and peace negotiations are in progress under United Nations (UN) auspices, the unresolved division of the ethnically Greek Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish-occupied Republic of Northern Cyprus has continued since 1974.

One strong possibility is that Cyprus and Turkey will enter the EU as part of a package deal. Greece wants Cyprus in the EU and, in 1998, threatened to veto membership for other states unless Cyprus was included. Greece has also opposed Turkey’s entry. Greece has finally lifted its veto against Turkey, and Turkey now has a special candidate status. If Cyprus succeeds in joining the EU before the Cyprus conflict is solved, Cypriot leaders have claimed they will veto Turkey’s membership.

Turkey remains an important strategic bridge between Europe and Asia. Its population is 99% Muslim, but its government is secular and Western in orientation. Turkey is also an important NATO ally—even more so as NATO and the EU consider military roles outside of Europe. Although there have been concerns over Turkey’s human rights record, the U.S. has encouraged the EU to admit Turkey lest Turkey decide it no longer wants to define its interests with the West.
The willingness of many European policy-makers to accept a country that is in the middle of political conflict also raises the issue of including the tumultuous Baltic states. The decision to invite these nations to join is more political than economic. Many Europeans hope that with a broader union, with as many members as possible, they will achieve greater political stability and security, as well as greater economic prosperity. Yet, key questions remain:

- At what point does instability within candidate states affect the security and prosperity of the whole union?
- With up to 28 member states within the next decade, will this overwhelm existing EU institutions?
- Will enlargement block progress toward integration?

Similar questions have also arisen with regard to NATO.

**NATO’s Post-Cold War Transformation**

In 1991, the Charter of Paris celebrated the end of the Cold War and looked to a future in which Europe would be “whole and free.” Within a year, the Soviet Union had disappeared entirely, and major efforts were underway to ensure that the once-formidable empire did not nose-dive into a state of chaos and violence.

Much like the aftermath of World War II, the solutions to European security issues seemed more political and economic than military. Still, for Europeans, America’s security guarantee was vital. As the U.S. pulled troops out of Europe in 1991 to fight in the Gulf War, then sent them directly back to the U.S. afterwards, European leaders feared that the U.S. had decided to disengage entirely. U.S. troop levels in Europe—325,000 troops in the late 1980s—declined toward 100,000. European leaders sought assurances from both President George Bush and President Clinton, that 100,000 U.S. troops was a “floor” rather than a “ceiling.” There remained a widespread fear that—without a U.S. military presence—Europe would deteriorate into chaos and old rivalries, rather than heal the wounds of the Cold War and those that remained from the hot wars that occurred before.

But what would NATO’s function be, without the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact?

As NATO wrestled with this question, the real world provided an answer with the violent break-up of the multi-ethnic state of Yugoslavia. Many Europeans saw this as an opportunity to fulfill the Treaty of Maastricht’s demand that Europe “reassert its identity on the international scene.” EU Commissioner Jacques Delors argued early in the conflict that the war in the Balkans was a European responsibility, an argument with which the U.S. readily agreed. By 1995, however, it was clear that Europe was not capable of playing an effective peacekeeping role. The U.S. intervened at the urging of France and the UK, each of which had sizeable military forces already engaged in the Balkans.

The 1995 Dayton Accords, which brought a fragile peace to Bosnia, required NATO to play a formal peacekeeping role in that country, with close to 40,000 troops from several countries, not only from NATO but including Russia and Ukraine.

As Bosnia settled into an uneasy peace, the Yugoslav province of Kosovo began to heat up. By 1999, NATO asserted itself even more confidently by launching military operations against Serbia to stop what was viewed as Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

Those operations were successful, although most observers—even those sympathetic to the use of force in this case—agree that NATO’s attacks violated international law. From NATO’s standpoint, these operations set another precedent—this was the first time NATO had ever engaged in combat, and it did so not because of Article V (no NATO country had been attacked), but because of broader security concerns in territory beyond NATO’s borders. NATO argued that the United Nations had declared Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing of Kosovo as a “threat to security and peace in the region,” and NATO nations retained the right of self-defense, even if no aggression against another state had actually occurred.

A Cold War alliance designed to protect the territory of its member states ultimately engaged in combat outside its members’ territory, against an adversary whose objectionable behavior was against its own citizens. This was clearly an expanded view of its purpose, outside the scope of Article V. NATO’s decision to engage Article V following the September 11th attacks suggests a continuing trend of redefining its security role in a new world.

**NATO Enlargement**

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of what were called “newly independent states” in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union created an opportunity to redefine Europe beyond the traditional East-West divide. States formerly dominated by the Soviet Union wanted to belong to a new Europe, motivated by political and security considerations even more than economic ones. With the map of Europe being redrawn, most of these states sought the security of being part of the transatlantic Alliance.

In 1994, NATO launched the “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) initiative, which eventually included 28 formerly Communist states, three of which—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—became full members of NATO in 1999.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO Members (19—with year joined)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (1949)</td>
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<td>Canada (1949)</td>
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<td>Denmark (1949)</td>
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<td>Luxembourg (1949)</td>
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<td>Norway (1949)</td>
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<td>United Kingdom (1949)</td>
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<td>United States (1949)</td>
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PfP was initially criticized as a “half-way house,” created by a reluctant NATO to appease those states that sought but would not get NATO membership. On the one hand, NATO saw an advantage in drawing Eastern European states into the western security framework. On the other hand, NATO did not want to antagonize Russia, which was having its own internal debates about how close it should be to the West. Many Russian leaders viewed NATO enlargement as a direct security threat.

In fact, PfP has emerged as an effective instrument for balancing those competing interests. For those states that want NATO membership, PfP allows them to become extremely active in virtually all of the institutions of defense cooperation within the Alliance, including defense planning and joint military operations.

For those states that do not seek NATO membership, PfP allows them to be part of the NATO consultation process without the obligations of membership. For example, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland—all states with a tradition of neutrality—are comfortable with PfP, because it allows them to avoid a potentially divisive debate at home about NATO membership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO “PfP” Partners (25)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Albania *</td>
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<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Azerbaijani</td>
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<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>Bulgaria *</td>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>Turkmenistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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* Country aspiring to NATO membership

Likewise, for all of the states of the former Soviet Union, NATO membership involves a difficult choice between deferring to Russia’s wishes and joining the West. PfP removes that difficulty—each of these states is in PfP, although some are much more active in NATO military activities than others.

Clearly, there is an advantage in NATO membership, since each member of the Alliance enjoys the protection of Article V—that “an attack on one is an attack on all.” At the same time, we have seen that this is no guarantee of military response by Allies. Allies are only obligated by the Treaty to consult with each other, but that is a right extended to Partners as well under the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.

Once NATO decided to enlarge its membership, it needed to deal with Russian concerns that enlargement threatened Russian security. Russians consistently argued that Russia was a great power, and that decisions regarding European security required Russian participation. On the one hand, Europeans did not want to exclude Russia; on the other hand, they did not want to give Russia too large a voice in European affairs. The answer—which paved the way for three new NATO members in 1999—was the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.

The key to NATO’s transformation over the past decade has been the creation of new institutions that parallel—but do not substitute for—NATO’s existing institutions. The North Atlantic Council, representing each member state, is the supreme political decision-making body within NATO. All decisions require consensus, so any single state—even Iceland, which has no military forces—can veto a decision. Participants in the Partnership for Peace are not part of that process, but they join NATO members in a separate EuroAtlantic Partnership Council. In addition, Russia meets with the NATO member states in the Permanent Joint Council, but this only offers Russia a special status without any special powers.

Although little appreciated on this side of the Atlantic, the broader Partnership framework within NATO may ultimately prove to be as important as the smaller circle of Alliance members. In Bosnia, for example, NATO commands military forces that include Partner states. NATO’s first discussions about whether to get involved in Kosovo came when Albania—a Partner state—asked for consultations.

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Neither Bosnia nor Kosovo, of course, were Article V operations for NATO. NATO did respond to September 11 by invoking Article V, but those consultations have also extended beyond the smaller circle of NATO membership to include Partner states such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, both of which are allowing U.S. and British forces to operate from their territory into Afghanistan.

How much NATO will enlarge further remains unknown. Some are fearful that allowing states of the former Soviet Union will antagonize Russia. But rejecting those states while agreeing to include others will suggest an invisible line drawn at the border of the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, not to invite any new states at NATO’s next summit meeting in 2002 will be seen as a failure to move forward at all on enlargement, despite years of assurances to states that have worked hard to earn membership.

**Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe**

In 1973, 34 European nations, including all members of NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, as well as “neutral” European states, launched the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Only in 1995, after considerable evolution, did it change its name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The CSCE grew out of Soviet proposals in the 1950s for a security conference among European states that, by definition, would have downgraded the role of “non-European” states such as the U.S. and Canada. When the CSCE finally met in 1973, during a period of growing East-West détente, it reflected Soviet recognition that the U.S. was a legitimate European power.

Two years of CSCE meetings produced the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, signed by all participating states. Part of the price for agreeing to Soviet demands for a European security conference was the inclusion of other issues—notably economics and human rights—that were of interest to the West. Hence, security in Europe was framed not just as a military question but as a comprehensive concept that included progress toward economic development and political democracy. Soviet and eastern European signatures on the Helsinki Final Act gave new legitimacy and visibility to those fighting communism.

By the 1980s, periodic CSCE meetings had developed a series of agreements on “confidence and security building measures” that helped stabilize the sometimes-fragile military confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Pact across the middle of Europe. After the Cold War, however, the CSCE assumed much greater importance.

In the early 1990s, some states—including, for different reasons, Russia and France—began to question the need for NATO even to continue after the Cold War, suggesting instead that the CSCE and its new Forum for Security Cooperation could become the basis for a new collective security organization in Europe. Some argued that the traditional threats to European security had disappeared, and that Europeans could assume a more equal voice in shaping their own security, without “dominance” from the U.S. A “Cold War institution” such as NATO would, they argued, only perpetuate the division of Europe.

NATO’s response, of course, was to begin to transform itself and to invite virtually all the members of the CSCE—now the OSCE—into its Partnership for Peace program and eventually some members of the former Warsaw Pact into full NATO membership. NATO remained important and unique, precisely because it included a security guarantee that did not exist in OSCE.

As the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disintegrated and newly independent states began to emerge in Europe in the early 1990s, the CSCE became the focus for efforts at conflict prevention in Europe, an area that has grown increasingly important over the past decade. In addition to arms control and confidence building measures, the CSCE and later OSCE began carving out a political role in the new states in Europe, helping to promote the establishment of democratic institutions, advancing human rights and a free media, and working to address ethnic minority issues that give rise to conflict.

At present, there are 55 European states participating in the OSCE. Decisions are made only by consensus, so any state can block a decision by the whole organization. The OSCE does not have the power to enforce its decisions, but does provide an additional forum for discussion of security concerns and addressing issues before they erupt into violent conflict. By the end of the century, OSCE had created a niche of its own, separate from the more narrow military focus of NATO and its Partnership for Peace and the economic and political focus of the European Union.

**The Council of Europe**

The Council of Europe is a separate institution from the European Union. The 43 diverse nations who hold membership in this council spread over Western Europe, the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, the states along the Mediterranean, and the remainder of Eastern Europe. Founded in 1949 under the Treaty of London, the Council of Europe deals with all aspects of European society, excluding defense, and is a forum for discussions on human rights, democracy, education, and public health. In 1998 the Council established a European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. The Council of Europe also consults with 350 nongovernmental organizations, welcoming a grass-roots perspective to these personal issues. The United States holds a special observer status.

**Implications for the U.S.—And the Legacy of 9/11**

Although the U.S. is the indispensable member of the NATO alliance, it can never be a member of the EU, a uniquely European institution that allows European countries to make their own decisions without American influence. On occasion, the U.S. has proposed having some kind of structured dialogue with the EU, and it now meets with the EU at an annual summit, but the U.S. can never be “at the EU table.”
In 1995, the U.S. and EU agreed on a “New Transatlantic Agenda,” designed to structure their consultations. Its four major fields of joint action are as follows:

- Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world;
- Responding to global challenges;
- Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations;
- Building bridges across the Atlantic

Although these seem very general, they establish a common interest in a range of political, economic, and security issues. This agenda also avoids a tendency to discuss security issues only in NATO or economic issues only in the EU. The agenda also requires effort to preserve a transatlantic bridge.

Nowhere is this blurring of agendas more contentious than with the issue of a European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Devised by the EU as an attempt to create a joint military capability that did not depend on NATO—an example of “self-help and mutual aid,” Europeans argue—the RRF is viewed by some in the U.S. as a competitor to NATO. The reality is that European military capabilities have fallen behind that of the U.S., and that Europeans need to mobilize their own resources to be a more equal partner in sharing the burdens of defense.

With the end of the Cold War and the removal of a common threat, it appeared to many that Europe and the U.S. were moving in different directions. Dr. Jeffrey Gedmin of the American Enterprise Institute warned, “At a time of unparalleled transatlantic cooperation and integration in trade, culture, and commerce ... there are signs that the strategic community is drifting apart.”

Dr. Ivo Daalder, a Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution suggested that a new style of American leadership was required: “The notion that you can just act in the way you did 25 years ago—which is that we’ll assert our leadership and expect others to follow—doesn’t play anymore. Unilateralism has nothing to do with whether you’re willing to talk to people. It’s whether you’re willing to take their views into account.”

In numerous ways, the dilemma that the U.S. faces at the dawn of the 21st century is a continuation of the one it faced after World War II, when it reluctantly assumed a mantle of leadership by virtue of its power, resources, and willingness to offer a security guarantee. At times, the U.S. has resented this role; at other times, it has resented Europe’s efforts to stand on its own.

In fact, neither American nor European unilateralism is an option. Simon Serfaty, Director of European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies explains: “[B]oth NATO and the European Union face a full and complex agenda. While the tasks and priorities differ from one institution to the other, the general principle remains the same: widen in order to deepen, deepen in order to widen, and reform in order to do both. Neither institution, however, can expect to address its agenda independently of the other. Each institutional agenda is separable from the other, but neither can be separated from the broader transatlantic agenda to which it belongs.”

In many respects, the tragedy of September 11th affirmed this common agenda, resulting in a remarkable demonstration of transatlantic solidarity. Citizens as well as governments were stunned by the attacks. With the focus on America’s tragedy, many almost forgot that several hundred European citizens were also casualties in the World Trade Center.

Almost immediately after the attacks, NATO engaged Article V for the first time in its history. As U.S. and British military forces prepared for other contingencies, NATO allies began to cover their NATO force commitments. Even NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft—under NATO, not U.S. command—patrolled American skies.

Additionally, an EU resolution shortly after the attacks promised specific legal, political, and financial actions against terrorism. Transatlantic agreement also produced strong measures in the United Nations Security Council. In a multi-faceted war in which military force is not the only—and perhaps not even the most important—instrument, the U.S. needs others to pressure terrorist cells and cut off financial resources in their countries. This is especially true in Europe, where many terrorists have been able to live and plan operations for some time.

Such timely responses from America’s allies in Europe demonstrate that both sides of the Atlantic recall what they share. As President Bush said, “We share more than an alliance. We share a civilization. Its values are universal, and they pervade our history and our partnership in a unique way.” Disagreements over trade, the environment, the death penalty, and missile defense lost their urgency, if not their substance. These issues did not disappear, but they have been overshadowed, at least while both sides of the Atlantic focus on what will likely be a long war against terrorism. September 11th reminded us that we still need each other—we remain “entangled.”

Yet, the underlying issues will reassert themselves in other ways, even as the war against terrorism continues. Europeans expect to emerge from this conflict as more equal partners with the U.S. How Washington reacts will shape U.S.-European relations for some time to come.

(Political Cartoon showing EU – US cooperation).
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World Wide Web Sites

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  - www.eurunion.org
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